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Abstract
It is widely recognized that “market failure” prevents eﬃcient risk
sharing in natural disaster insurance. As a consequence, many countries
adopted institutional frameworks presenting public sector participation,
often praised as public-private partnerships. We define risk selection as
a situation where private companies pass insurance of high risk agents
on to the public “partner”, arguing that this is a potentially important
issue in such situations. In order to illustrate our concerns we look at
the case of France. We build a simple model that incorporates the main
features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high
and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurer. We show
that in our model, risk selection is likely to be present at equilibrium
and discuss the policy options available. When comparing with the
actual situation in France we find that the “stylized facts” of the system
correspond to our results. Additionally, the policies implemented by the
government correspond to policies characterized to reduce the potential
of risk selection.
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1 Introduction
“Market failure” in natural disaster insurance is widely recognized. In a recent
paper, Gollier (2005) discusses aspects that lead to a breakdown of eﬃcient
risk sharing, such as, among other, the existence of asymmetric information,
limited liability of insurance companies and the suboptimal possibility of time
diversification of insurers as reasons. The recommended policy options include
in most cases some sort of public sector intervention. Particularly interesting
are the ideas that “[t]he existence of extensive bankruptcy costs on financial
markets implies that catastrophe risks cannot be insured without the govern-
ment playing the role of reinsurer of last resort.” (p. 11) and that “...the state
may be in a better situation to organize time diversification.” (p. 16). Both
statements indicate an active role of the public sector in disaster insurance.
This is indeed the case. Von Ungern (2004) discusses natural disaster in-
surance in five European countries (England, Spain, France, Switzerland and
Germany). The scope of public intervention ranges from “laissez-faire” in
England to state owned monopoly in Spain and parts of Switzerland, via the
abolition of state monopolies in Germany and public reinsurance in France. In
the USA, natural disaster insurance is in part provided by the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA) through its National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP).
Based on the widespread consensus that some sort of public-private part-
nership is optimal to deal with the issues of market failure in natural disaster
insurance, we argue that “risk selection” is a potentially harmful concern, with
significant financial consequences for the taxpayer. We define risk selection as
a situation where private companies are able to pass insurance of high risk
agents to the public part of the private-public partnership.1 Actually, such
behaviour is quite intuitive for profit maximizing firms, which have all the
incentives to use a particular institutional framework to their advantage.
Risk selection can arise in situations where the public sector provides insur-
ance for agents the private insurers do not want to cover, or where the public
sector provides reinsurance. In a situation were existing natural disaster insur-
ance schemes are or have been under financial distress (e.g. France, US) and,
additionally, many countries do not have an adequate system of protection
1Our definition is similar to the one used by the World Health Organization, applied
to a context of public sector participation. “(A) process whereby an insurer tries to at-
tract people with a lower-than-average expected risk ...and deter those with a higher-than-
average expected risk in order to increase profits; the process can be explicit or covert”
(www.euro.who.int). We do not use the term adverse selection, since this is generally
associated with asymmetric information in the litterature. We think that asymmetric in-
formation is not fundamentally important for natural disaster insurance and abstract from
this in our model.
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against the financial and economic consequences of natural disasters,2 the call
for reforms of existing, or implementation of new, institutional frameworks for
natural disaster insurance is evident.
In order to demonstrate the potential for risk selection and its significant
financial implications we consider the French system of natural disaster in-
surance (“assurance catastrophe naturelle”). This institutional setup is some-
times praised as a successful public-private partnership (see e.g. Michel Kerjan
(2001) or Gollier (2005)), and is likely to be considered as a potential exam-
ple to reform existing disaster insurance systems in other countries or as the
guideline to create new systems.
To illustrate the potential weaknesses of the French system, we build a
simple model that captures the essential features of the institutional setup,
such as a unique (and risk independent) premium rate across the country
and the existence of a publicly owned reinsurance company. We show that
risk selection is a likely equilibrium outcome under this setup, leading to a
financially untenable situation for the reinsurance company. We then explore
the possible policy alternatives within the model to deal with risk selection,
including premium increases and limiting the degree of reinsurance. We next
compare the predictions of our model with the observed developments of the
French system since its creation in 1982/83. We find that the French system
exhibits the main characteristics of the equilibrium outcome described in our
model, and that the policy reactions of the authorities are very similar to the
ones our model suggests as the ones that might be used to reduce the degree
of risk selection. We then provide an outlook of the future sustainability of
the system. We conclude that risk selection is likely to continue to be an
important issue within the French system. The system already needed to be
refinanced at a substantial cost to the taxpayer and it seems likely that the
same might reoccur again in the (not so distant) future.
The role of the public sector in the provision of natural disaster insurance
has been recognized as early as the 1970’s (e.g Kunreuther, 1974). Jaﬀee and
Russell (1997) argue that, despite the potential to increase private sector par-
ticipation in natural disaster insurance, the “government will continue to be an
essential player in catastrophe insurance markets”. Lewis and Murdock (1996)
discuss the reinsurance of natural disasters, indicating that the public sector
can exploit intertemporal diversification to complement the private insurance
market. A point similar to the one outlined by Gollier (2005). Rather than
contributing to this direction of research, we take the role of the public sector
as given and analyze potential consequences in terms of risk selection.
It is in health insurance that risk selection has been discussed to a certain
extent. Newhouse (1996) presents a good early survey of the main issues in the
2A situation that was dramatically illustrated by the 2004 Tsunami-earthquake in South-
east Asia, or, for that matter, by 2005 hurricane "Katrina" in the United States.
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health insurance market both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
More recently, some empirical papers have attempted to assess whether risk
selection is indeed present in health insurance or not. The evidence seems to
be mixed: On the one hand, Polsky and Nicholson (2004) “find no evidence
that HMO plans attract a disproportionate share of low-risk enrollees”. On the
other hand, Nicholson et. al. find risk selection for employer-sponsored plans
(Nicholson et al., 2004). Shen and Ellis (2002), using simulation methods,
find that risk selection can remain profitable for insurers even after the im-
plementation of risk-adjustment formulas, while Lehmann and Zweifel (2003)
document that risk selection partly explains the cost advantages of HMOs.
The reminder of this paper considers the case of the natural disaster in-
surance in France. We first outline and discuss the institutional framework
implemented by the French government, discussing the main changes to the
system since its inception. We next build a simple model to evaluate this
framework. We then compare the model’s outcome to the actual situation in
France and conclude with an outlook on the future of this particular insurance
scheme.
2 The Case of France
2.1 The institutional framework
Natural disaster insurance was introduced in France in 1982 as a reaction to
a severe flood a few months earlier. The term “natural disaster” (“catastro-
phe naturelle”) is not defined in the law creating the system.3 A commission,
formed of representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Finance and Environ-
ment, has to decide whether a given occurrence is deemed a natural disaster
and hence makes claimants eligible for reimbursement. The conditions of in-
surance (in particular premium rates and excesses) are fixed by decree and
uniform across the country. Insurance is compulsory, presumably to reduce
problems of adverse selection among property owners. Similarly, all insurance
companies oﬀering (other types of) property insurance in a specific area are
obliged to include protection against natural disasters. Premium rates are
defined as a percentage of other property insurance premiums (in particular
fire), while excesses (for non-commercial buildings) are fixed per contract and
3The description below is drawn from von Ungern (2004). The author also provides a
more in depth description of the natural disaster insurance in France. Additional information
was obtained from a letter by the CEO of the public reinsurer to a private insurer dated in
October 1996 (CCR, 1996). The letter is written in French, any translations in this paper
have been done by the authors, which are not certified translators. Copies of this letter can
be obtained from the authors upon request.
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per event.4
An important institutional feature of the system is the existence of a pub-
licly owned reinsurance company, the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR).
Reinsurance is not compulsory, and insurers are free to contract with other,
private, reinsurance companies. Reinsurance with the state reinsurance com-
pany is, however, potentially attractive, both because the reinsurance premi-
ums charged are low and because it can oﬀer unlimited cover (it is covered
by a state guarantee). Insurance companies that decide to reinsure with the
public reinsurer are oﬀered two types of contracts; proportional contracts (for
a given percentage of premium income the reinsurance company covers a given
percentage of claims) and stop-loss contracts (the reinsurance company covers
all claims that exceed a given multiple of annual premium income).
The initial conditions of insurance were the following: The premium rate
was set at 5.5% of the basic housing insurance contract, and excesses for a
residential structure were FF 800. The basic CCR conditions were: for pro-
portional contracts insurers could choose any rate of reinsurance between 40%
and 90%. Stop-loss contracts were only oﬀered to insurers that also partici-
pated in the proportional contract. Conditions for the stop-loss contracts were
negotiated on a case by case basis. Furthermore, the CCR oﬀered a commis-
sion for administrative expenses to the private insurers of 24% of the reinsured
premium income.
2.2 The main changes to the system since its creation
There have been four major changes to the system since its creation in 1982.
In 1983, i.e. just one year after its creation, the premium rates for buildings
were increased by more than 50% (from 5.5% to 9%). At the same time the
excesses were also revised upwards (from FF800 to FF1500).
In 1990 the French overseas districts (Départements Outre Mer, DOM)
were included in the natural disaster insurance scheme, i.e. insurers had to
provide disaster insurance if they wanted to operate in the DOM. The private
insurers accepted this introduction only under the condition that these territo-
ries could be reinsured separately from the mainland portfolio. The legislator
and the CCR accepted this condition.
4One could argue that it is impossible to treat the natural disaster insurance “market”
independently from other housing insurance, since these contracts are sold together. We
would argue that this is not the case. It is easily conceivable that losses in the natural
disaster segment drive an insurer out of a particular region, even if premium income from
this segment is relatively small. Imagine a region where the basic housing insurance is
delivered in a competitive market with no returns to scale. Clearly, an insurer would opt
not to provide insurance in a situation where the disaster insurance incurrs losses, even if
the fraction of premium income from this segment is small.
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In 1996, after its reserves had dwindled to less than €300 million (2 billion
FF), the CCR substantially revised its reinsurance conditions. The range for
the proportional reinsurance rate was reduced to a rate between 40% (mini-
mum unchanged) and 60% (maximum reduced by 30 percentage points). The
minimum retention rate for the insurers in the proportional reinsurance cover
was thus increased from 10% to 40%. For insurers with a high share of indus-
trial risks, the maximum rate was further limited to 40%, i.e. their compulsory
retention rate was fixed at 60%. The possibilities to obtain stop-loss cover were
also reduced. The minimum loss for the insurer before the stop-loss could come
into play was increased to equal 100% of the insurers total (gross) premium
income. For small insurers or insurers with a bad risk portfolio (mainly in-
dustrial risks or risks in the DOM (Guadeloupe, Martinique)), the minimum
excess was even higher. Finally, the commission to cover administrative costs
varied, according to the historic claims/premium ratio of the insurers, between
18% and 24%.
In spite of these changes the CCR was virtually bankrupt by the end of
the year 1999 (see discussion below). The resulting financial injection by the
government was accompanied by a major financial reorganisation.
The premium rate was increased by one third (from 9% to 12%) and their
excesses were multiplied by a factor of (approximately) 2.5 The commission
for administrative costs has been entirely abolished. The rate of proportional
reinsurance was fixed at 50%, i.e. the maximal and minimal rates are now
equal.
If the insurance companies wish to continue obtaining separate cover for
their risks situated in the DOM, they can do so only at the cost of accepting
a substantial excess (1600% of annual premium income) on those risks.
2.3 The financial evolution of the system
We next turn to the financial evolution of the disaster insurance system in
France.
Table 1 presents financial information of the system in its first 20 years
of existence. The first column of data presents the industry claims/premium
(C/P) ratio. Over the period 1982-2001 the average C/P ratio was 58%,
with important yearly variation due to the infrequent occurrence of natural
disasters.
The second column gives an estimate of the overall profitability (including
capital income) of the system. The methodology used for this computation is
detailed in Appendix A1. Accumulated system-wide profits over the first 20
years are estimated at roughly 7.2 billion €.
5The factor is less than 2 for damage due to floodings, and more than 6 for damage due
to subsidence.
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Table 1
Financial performance of the system
Year
C / P
Ratio
(%)
Accum.
surplus
(million €)
Rate of
reins.
(%)
CCR
revenue
(million €)
CCR
Reserves
(million €)
’82/’83 163 -214 83 243 n.a.
’84 5 93 75 297 n.a.
’85 3 496 75 335 n.a.
’86 12 918 73 341 223
’87 36 1,281 52 274 338
’88 52 1,618 41 232 424
’89 46 2,012 51 234 416
’90 99 2,135 43 238 466
’91 42 2,638 40 235 483
’92 77 2,958 38 234 525
’93 116 3,050 41 263 499
’94 48 3,547 41 297 406
’95 91 3,800 45 320 349
’96 83 4,140 39 348 300
’97 53 4,691 40 304 310
’98 50 5,261 40 303 230
’99 88 5,526 40 303 155
’00 33 6,316 48 447 261
’01 32 7,231 47 469 427
’02 n.a n.a n.a 515 591
’03 n.a n.a n.a 628 340
’04 n.a n.a n.a 680 418
Sources: von Ungern (2004) and CCR (2003, 2005). Due to the diﬀerent years covered by
the various sources, not all information is available over the full period.
Column three shows the rate of reinsurance of the private insurers. One
can observe the important drop in the rate of reinsurance from above 80% at
the beginning of the system to 40% (the lowest the CCR would allow, while
still oﬀering stop-loss contracts) by the end of the 1990’s. Note that the final
increase in the rate of reinsurance was the introduction of the unique rate of
50% by the reinsurer.6
6The reason why the rate of reinsurance is not exactly equal to 50% is due to the fact
that the figures include insurance/reinsurance of minor items such as vehicles, which are
not subject to the 50%-rule.
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Finally, columns four and five indicate information on the financial evolu-
tion of the CCR, presenting the ceded premium income and the evolution of
reserves of the public reinsurer. We come back to the interpretation of this
evolution in Section 4.
We will first build a simple model of this institutional framework. We want
to include the main elements of the French system, while still keep the model
analytically tractable. These elements are:
1. A premium rate that is independent of risk, modeled via a uniform rate
across the country.
2. Existence of a single (publicly owned) reinsurance company.
3. Insurers can, but need not, contract reinsurance.
We shall not explicitly model the stop-loss contracts, since in our (highly
symmetric) model, their introduction would not add any substantial new in-
sights. We discuss these contracts in Section 4 as well.
3 A simple model
Consider a simple model of a country with two regions of equal size i ∈ [H;L].
A region has a stock of H houses, each of (normalized) value 1. We assume
that a region is subdivided into a finite number of counties, each with housing
stock M. A county can be aﬀected by damage, which destroys the county
completely (damage value =M). Damage occurrence for each county in region
i is assumed to follow a binomial distribution with the probability of damage
equal to pi. We assume that damage occurrence is independent both among
counties and among regions. Hence, for each region the expected damage is
Hpi. Regions diﬀer only in the respective probability of an event occurring,
with the H-region having a higher probability of damage than the L-region
(pH > pL).
Housing insurance is compulsory, and its price is fixed at rate θ independent
of pi. The insurance service is provided by identical insurers in a competitive
market. Therefore, the market outcome in the model will be determined by
symmetric, free-entry equilibrium. Whenever an insurer j decides to oﬀer
service in a particular region i, its market share will be given by 1/Ni, where
Ni is the number of insurers active in the region.7
There exists a single reinsurance company which oﬀers proportional con-
tracts to the market in all regions.8 Reinsurance is voluntary, and each insurer
7We work with free-entry equilibria to make the model simple. A high N in the model
represents the substantial profits earned by the French insurers (see discussion below).
8This is an exact model of the proportional reinsurance cover the CCR oﬀered prior to
2001.
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can decide on the fraction of the portfolio that it wants to reinsure. We de-
note by rj ∈ [0, 1] the rate of retention for insurer j.9 Note that an insurer
can reinsure only its entire portfolio and therefore can choose only one level
of rj, even when active in both regions.
The premium income from the fraction of the portfolio that is reinsured is
divided as follows. The insurer keeps a percentage γ to cover administrative
costs and passes on (1 − γ) to the reinsurance company. For the remaining
portfolio, the insurer keeps the entire premium income. The reinsurer covers
the fraction (1− rj) of claims payments. In terms of a particular house in
region i, revenue for insurer j from signing a natural disaster insurance contract
can be expressed by the following random variable:
Revj (i) =
½
θγ + rjθ(1− γ)
θγ + rj [θ(1− γ)− 1]
with prob. (1− pi)pi
The insurer is certain to obtain θγ for each house it has under contract.
Further, with probability (1 − pi) the house does not suﬀer a damage. The
insurer then receives the remaining premium income for the fraction of retained
risks (rj). With probability pi the house is destroyed (damage value equals 1)
and “net revenue” to the insurer is the fraction of remaining premium income
minus the fraction of damage that the insurance company bears.
For the direct insurers all costs other than claims payments are assumed
to be fixed. We consider two types of fixed costs. A region specific fixed
cost (f) and a country specific fixed cost (F ). F represents the fact that
some costs, such as setting up a countrywide representation, must be incurred
independently of the number of regions covered. Other fixed costs, such as
local branch activities, are specific to a particular region. For simplicity we
assume that regional fixed costs (f) are the same in both regions.10 The
country specific fixed cost (F ) plays a crucial role in this model. Without it,
there would be no incentive for an insurer to serve both regions. In fact, in
the absence of F and under a competitive insurance market characterized by
free entry, each individual insurer will seek a homogeneous risk portfolio in
order to choose an optimal rate of retention. Only through the introduction of
country fixed costs might an insurer actually want to provide service in both
regions in our model.
Insurers are risk averse. Insurer j’s expected utility is given by
E [u (πj)] = E [πj]−
λ
2
V ar [πj] ,
where πj is profit of insurer j, and λ is the parameter of risk aversion.
9Hence (1− rj) is the fraction of the portfolio that is reinsured.
10One could argue that administrative costs in the H-regions are higher since there will
be, on average, more cases to evaluate and forms to fill out. We abstract from this.
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Additionally to the rate of retention, each insurer can decide where to be
active. We distinguish two types of insurers: A specialist (insurer) serves only
one specific region, while a generalist (insurer) serves both regions. Expres-
sions for expected profits and its variance are
E [πj] =
H
Ni
[θγ + rj (θ (1− γ)− pi)]− f − F, (1a)
V ar [πj] = r2j
H
Ni
pi (1− pi) , (1b)
for specialists; and
E [πj] =
½ H
NL [θγ + rj (θ (1− γ)− pL)]
+ HNH [θγ + rj (θ (1− γ)− pH)]− 2f − F,
(2a)
V ar [πj] = r2j
· H
NL
pL (1− pL) +
H
NH
pH (1− pH)
¸
, (2b)
for generalists. Given the two types of insurers, three equilibrium charac-
terizations are possible: all insurers are specialists =⇒ a specialist equilibrium
(SE); all insurers are generalists =⇒ a generalist equilibrium (GE); both spe-
cialists and generalists coexist =⇒ a hybrid equilibrium (HE).
Insurers maximize expected utility, while free-entry determines the num-
ber of active insurers such that expected utility is zero. Since there is no
asymmetric information in the model, the equilibrium concept used is Nash
equilibrium. Even though this model setup seems to us to be as simple as
possible, it is not possible to obtain useful analytic expressions for the equi-
librium conditions for hybrid equilibria. For this reason we restrict the rest of
our analysis to “specialist” and “generalist” equilibria. For each equilibrium
candidate we calculate the conditions such that deviation (D) is not profitable.
Note that the set of possible deviations is not very large. Retiring from the
market is never a profitable deviation, since equilibria are characterized by
zero expected utility. Deviation strategies are defined by entering or retiring
from a particular region choosing the optimal rate of retention. Equilibrium
conditions, as well as the expression for the equilibrium rate of retention and
number of insurers, are given in Table 2, where we have introduced notation
for the the “risk-adjusted unitary profit” for insurer j in region i
ωij =
·
θγ + rj [θ (1− γ)− pi]−
λ
2
(rj)2 pi (1− pi)
¸
. (3)
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Table 2
Equilibrium conditions
Eqm
Rate of
retention
Number
of insurers
Eqm. condition
SE rj = θ(1−γ)−piλpi(1−pi) Ni =
Hωi
f+F
f
h
HωLD
HωL+f+F +
ωHD
ωH − 2
i
+
F
h
HωLD
HωL+f+F +
ωHD
ωH − 1
i
< 0
GE r∗G =
θ(1−γ)−pL+θ(1−γ)−pH
λ[pL(1−pL)+pH(1−pH)] NG =
HωG
2f+F
ωL
ωG (2f + F )− f − F < 0
Note: The displayed expression for the number of insurers corresponds to an interior
solution for the rate of retention. The deviation strategy (D) in the SE is to become a
generalist, while in the GE it is to reduce service to the L-region.
Figure 1: Equilibrium areas for generalist and specialist equilibria.
Parameter values: H=100,000, γ=0.2, f=100, F=200, λ=1.
Figure 1, illustrates the equilibrium conditions for a set of specific para-
meter values in the θ-pH space.11 The shaded areas correspond to the areas
11Without loss of generality we define pH and pL in terms of a mean preserving spread
p = pH+pL2 , which implies that high values of pH correspond to large diﬀerences in the
damage probabilities between the regions. We assume θ to be at least actuarially fair.
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of generalist equilibria with interior rates of retention and the case of spe-
cialist equilibria with full reinsurance in the high probability region. The line
GE cond represents situations where the generalist equilibrium condition holds
with equality; the line SE cond represents situations where the specialist equi-
librium conditions holds, while the third line represent points where rH = 0.
The graph illustrates that the area of GE exists only for low levels of the
premium rate or for small diﬀerences in damage probabilities across regions,
while the (particular) specialist equilibrium occurs for high diﬀerences in dam-
age probabilities. This characterizes the fundamental trade-oﬀ in the model:
for small probability diﬀerences, the incentive to distribute the country fixed
cost between two regions prevails (generalist insurers), while for larger diﬀer-
ences the incentive to optimally set the rate of retention dominates (specialist
insurers). Note that in the remaining areas of the graph other equilibrium
characterizations would apply (such as hybrid equilibria or specialist equilib-
ria with an interior rate of retention also in theH-region).12 Moving north-east
in the graph implies thus the following: either some (or all) insurers decide to
become specialists, or the premium rate is suﬃciently high such that rj = 1
for all insurers.13
We are now in the position to analyze the problem of risk selection within
the model. Risk selection aﬀects the situation of the reinsurance company. It
may end up with a disproportionate share of risks from the high probability
region in its portfolio. We can define a simple measure of the degree of risk
selection in our case: the number of high risks divided by the number of low
risks that are reinsured. In our model this measure is
ρ =
(1− rH) NSHNSH+NG + (1− rG)
NG
NSH+NG
(1− rL) NSLNSL+NG + (1− rG)
NG
NSL+NG
, (4)
where NSH represents the number of specialists in the high probability
region, etc.
The numerator consists of a weighted average of the rate of reinsurance
in the H-region of specialists (1− rH) and generalists (1− rG), weighted by
the percentage of insurers of each type in this region. The denominator is
the equivalent expression for the L-region. A value of ρ = 1 implies that
the reinsurer has a balanced portfolio (the same percentage of reinsurance in
both regions. Values of ρ > 1 imply a certain degree of risk selection.14 “Full
12Indeed, our model satisfies the conditions of Proposition 8.D.3 of Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995) implying existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
13Jametti and von Ungern (2004) analyze, in a similar model with a linear utility function,
the eﬀect of an increase in the premium rate on the equilibrium outcome. They show that a
discrete increase in θ leads either to a situation with more insurers operating as specialists
or all insurers fully retaining their risks.
14Values of ρ < 1 do not occur in equilibrium.
12
risk selection”, a situation where the reinsurer only reinsures risks from the
H-region implies a value of ρ =∞.
We are also interested in the expression for the expected profits of the
reinsurer. For this we assume that the reinsurer does not incur costs other
than the claims payments. Expected profits are then given by
πR =
X
i
X
j
Nij
NiS +NiG
H (1− rij) [θ (1− γ)− pi] . (5)
For example, in the case of a generalist equilibrium this expression reduces
to
πR = H (1− rG) [(θ (1− γ)− pL) + (θ (1− γ)− pH)] .
Figure 2 takes up our example of generalist and specialist equilibrium areas
and illustrates the outcome in terms of our measure of risk selection (ρ) and
expected profits of the reinsurer (πR), for premium rates that are at least
actuarially fair.
Figure 2: degree of risk selection and profits of reinsurer. Parameter values
as in Figure 1.
Quite naturally, in the case of a generalist equilibrium, there is no risk
selection. However, it must be noted that an important part of the area is in
situations where the reinsurance company is not financially viable. Indeed, the
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vertical line indicates points where (θ (1− γ)− pL)+(θ (1− γ)− pH) = 0, i.e.
below this line the reinsurer is not financially viable even in a case where it
receives the entire housing portfolio. For the upper left part of theGE-area, πR
can be positive or negative. The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
If the premium rate is suﬃciently low so that the insurers can make little profit
even on the low risks (in excess of the share of premiums they keep to cover
their administrative costs) then they will purchase full reinsurance. However,
the premium income for the reinsurer might then not be suﬃciently high to
cover its expected claims payments.
In the case of a specialist equilibrium, there is always a certain degree of
risk selection (ρ > 1). Specialist insurers in the H-region will have a lower
rate of retention (a higher rate of reinsurance) than their counterparts in the
L-region. Actually, given our parameter values, the SE-area corresponds to
a situation with “full risk selection”, where specialists in the H-region fully
reinsure and those in the L-region fully retain their risks. In such a situation,
the expected profit of the reinsurer must be negative.
Thus, a move north-east in the graph implies a higher degree of risk selec-
tion (as long as there is any reinsurance), and this situation might lead to a
worsening of the financial situation of the reinsurance company.
In conclusion, risk selection is an important feature of our model unless
the country specific fixed costs are very large. It is particularly significant in
situations where there are big diﬀerences in the damage probabilities across
regions.
What would be the policy measures to remedy the situation?
One could argue that risk-dependent premium rates are an easy and imme-
diate solution to risk selection within the model. This might be a somewhat
fast conclusion. First of all, risk-dependent premium rates do not imply auto-
matically a generalist equilibrium outcome. It might be that premium rates,
although diﬀerentiated across regions, are such that insurers still have the in-
centive to specialize into one region, hence not eliminating the problem of risk
selection. Furthermore, significantly higher charges in disaster prone areas
might not be politically feasible. In the case of France, the uniform premium
rate is a fundamental cornerstone of the system. Changing this feature has
not been considered so far.15
A uniform increase in the premium rate might not be an adequate solution
for two reasons: first, it might actually worsen the problem of risk selection,
as a higher premium rate increases the incentive of insurers to specialize into a
homogeneous risk portfolio (see Figure 2); second, increasing premium rates,
15More generally, redistribution towards people living in high damage areas seems accept-
able to most societies worldwide. Otherwise it would be diﬃcult to explain the significant
public and private disaster relief spending. Frame (2001) shows that redistribution towards
households in disaster prone areas might be beneficial also to households in safe areas.
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in particular increasing premium rates above actuarially fair rates, comes at a
cost to the final customer, who pays an ever higher price for the service.16 In
our model, due to the free-entry assumption, higher premium rates translate
into a higher number of insurers in the market, which creates an ineﬃciency
since regional and country fixed costs are multiplied.17
A more adequate policy mix would consist of two measures: increase the
premium rate and make a substantial rate of reinsurance compulsory. The
problem of risk selection is created by the possibility of insurers to serve only
the low risk customers, buy little reinsurance and make profits on these low
risk customers. The model shows that insurers have an incentive to do so. If
these insurers are forced to reinsure a substantial part of their portfolio, the
cost for them of accepting some high risk customers will fall, and this leads to
a reduction in the degree of risk selection (ρ)
4 Discussion
4.1 Does the model apply to the case of France?
We next compare the prediction of our model with the developments of the
French natural disaster system as outlined in Section 2. We argue that risk
selection is a fundamental flaw that lead to the virtual collapse of the system
by the year 2000. Our conjecture is supported by the fact that many of the
policy changes outlined in section 2 can easily be interpreted as being designed
to reduce the problems of risk selection. Ideally, one would, of course, like to
analyse these issues on the basis of individual firm data, in particular to obtain
an empirical measure of ρ. Unfortunately, no firm-level data is available, and
we have to limit ourselves to the interpretation of system-wide information.
Before turning to the specific aspects of the development of the disaster
insurance system it is important to appreciate that the institutional setup,
with proportional and stop-loss contracts, implies the CCR will bear most
of the cost when a large-scale disaster occurs. If the reinsurer is unable to
accumulate suﬃcient reserves to face “spikes” in damage payments, this will
trigger the state guarantee. Hence, the tax payer might end up paying the bill
of a large disaster, or a series of large disasters.
16Jametti and von Ungern (2004) provide an analysis of the cost of service provision in
their simpler model.
17Indeed from a cost-of-service perspective, our model would imply a single insurer pro-
viding the service. In this case, the amount of fixed costs is minimized. One could argue that
such a situation might not be politically feasible, although in Spain natural disaster insur-
ance is (quite successfully) provided by a single public insurance company, the “Consorcio
de Compensacion de Seguros” (see von Ungern (2004) for details).
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Let us turn to the overall performance of the system as indicated in Table
1.
The average claims/premium (C/P) ratio since inception of the system
is 58%, which is in line with other segments of the insurance industry. The
crucial diﬀerence is that within the French system, where natural disaster
contracts are an add-on to basic housing insurance contracts, acquisition and
administrative costs should be very low. Indeed, von Ungern (2004) presenting
data for Spain indicates that the C/P ratio for the period 1971 to 1999 there
was of the order of 98%.18
Despite the system-wide financial viability (estimated accumulated profits
of 7.2 billion €), the surplus of the system was not used to keep the public
part of the private-public partnership afloat. We can observe that the premium
income of the CCR remained fairly stable over time and, more importantly,
the reinsurer was never able to accumulate significant reserves. Indeed, the
reserves of the CCR were drained from over 500 million € in 1992 to practically
zero in 1999. At this point the French government stepped in, refinancing the
CCR with approximately 450 million €. In spite of the substantial premium
hike in 1999 the CCR’s reserves were still only at 427 million € by the end of
2001, i.e. less than the government injection of funds. Thus, the entire surplus
of the system landed in the pockets of the private insurers.
How could it come to this situation? In light of our simple model, risk
selection is the answer.
A first point to note is the rapid rise in the retention rate of the insures from
17% in 82/83 to 60% in 1990 (see Table 1). Two symptoms would contribute
to explaining this development. First, the substantial rise in premium rates
in 1984 made a higher retention rate much more attractive. Second, this
same rise in premium rates and the accompanying reduction in retention rates
made it more expensive to keep high risks on a portfolio of essentially low risks.
Specialising on low risk customers, and retaining all risks, or specialising on
high risk customers and reinsuring became much more profitable strategies
than oﬀering across-the-board service. Note that this is exactly the result of
our model, i.e. higher premium rates imply lower rates of reinsurance and
might lead to more risk selection. As mentioned, we do not have firm level
data to establish whether this is in fact what happened.
Furthermore, the changes in the CCR’s reinsurance policies introduced in
1996 and 1999 do give a strong indication that risk selection was in fact a
major problem.
The maximum rate of reinsurance was reduced in 1996 and 2000 to end
up in a unique rate of 50%. In the year 2000 the premium rates were further
18The Spanish “consorcio”, while achieving low administrative costs, also benefited from
significant interest earnings on their reserves during periods of high inflation. This explains
the somewhat suprisingly high C/P ratio.
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increased from 9% to 12%, while the generous commission for administrative
costs was abolished.19 In 1996 the CCR forced higher excesses on the stop-loss
contracts, in particular for insurers operating in high damage areas like the
DOM. In the year 2000 the CCR introduced important excesses (1600% of
premium income) for insurers wishing not to pool their DOM risks with the
rest of their portfolio.
All these policies are easily understandable if one accepts risk selection to
be a problem in the system. All these policies aim at increasing the amount
of low risks in the portfolio of the reinsurer. They are, indeed, in line with our
policy discussion in the last section, increase the premium rate and increase
the rate of reinsurance.
Quite obviously, our model abstracts from various points of reality. It is
conceivable to build a much more complex model that explains the outcome
in France without relying on risk selection. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, we
favour our simple and straightforward explanation.
As a final point of illustration of the problems of risk selection we quote the
communication of the CCR to the private insurers from 1996, when outlining
the situation in the DOM: “The logic of the system requires that there should,
at the reinsurance level, be some degree of coinsurance between the insurers
heavily engaged in the DOM and those that have no contracts in that region.
However, the major events like the floodings due to the three hurricanes in
1995 have allowed us to establish, that the CCR has had to cover 98% of the
costs, i.e for these events 650 million Francs, as compared to 24 million Francs
income in the form of reinsurance premiums. It has thus become necessary to
reestablish an equilibrium that is more acceptable to the market as a whole,
by raising the excess of the non-proportional reinsurance cover to be born by
the insurers” (CCR, 1996).
4.2 An outlook
When trying to assess the eﬃciency of the system as it now stands, a first point
to emphasise is that it is getting more and more costly for the houseowner. As
shown, the overall system was economically viable with the premium rates set
in 1984. Nevertheless, rates were increased by one third in the year 2000. The
houseowners now have to pay considerably more for a lower coverage (higher
excesses).
Second, while the CCR’s premium income more than doubled from 303
million € in 1999 to 680 million € in 2004 (CCR, 2005) its reserves, after
increasing to almost 600 million € in 2002, are currently only slightly over 400
million €. This is nowhere near the amount necessary to cover the reinsurance
cost of a major natural disaster.
19In Spain the commission paid by the “Consorcio” is 5%.
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Finally, it is unclear at what stage a private insurer might decide that it is
more profitable to concentrate on the good risks, and stop buying reinsurance
cover from the CCR altogether. There is always the possibility to turn to
private competitive reinsurance companies. They may be unwilling to oﬀer
unlimited reinsurance cover, but it is likely that for a good portfolio they can
oﬀer considerably lower costs of reinsurance.
It is thus much less than certain whether the “carrot” of unlimited reinsur-
ance cover will in the long run be suﬃcient to limit the extent of risk selection
and allow the CCR to reinsure a suﬃciently large fraction of the low risks the
lawmaker intended to subsidise the system.
5 Conclusions
Most insurance schemes currently in use include various degrees of public sec-
tor participation. Often, such as in the case of France, institutional setups are
praised as public-private partnership. We argue that in such situations careful
thought should be given to the issue of risk selection, where we define risk se-
lection as a situation where private insurers “pass on” high damage probability
agents to the public part of the partnership.
To illustrate our concerns we analyze the case of the French natural disaster
insurance system. We build a simple model to represent the current system
and show that, in our model, risk selection is a likely outcome, in particular
if there exist significant regional diﬀerences in damage probabilities. Policies
to remedy this situation focus on achieving a better balanced portfolio for the
(public) reinsurer. Observing the evolution of the system in France we find
that exactly such policies were implemented, culminating in a refinancing of
the reinsurer with approximately 450 million € in 1999. At the same time,
premium rates were increased by 33% even though the overall system had been
financially viable in its first 20 years of existence.
It is, quite obviously, easily conceivable to build a more complex model
that explains the outcome in France without relying on risk selection. In the
spirit of Occam’s razor we favour our, admittedly simple, explanation of the
facts.
Unfortunately we cannot test our hypothesis with individual firm data.
Our conclusion is based on system-wide aggregates. A useful extension to this
research would be to analyze firm behaviour. Similarly, it would be interesting
to consider the potential for risk selection in other institutional settings, such
as the one applied currently in the USA.
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A Calculation of system surplus
In this appendix we briefly describe our financial performance evaluation of
the natural disaster insurance system in France.20 Data were obtained from
the oﬃcial CCR publications and the IMF International Financial Statistics
Yearbook (2004).
We first calculate the per year gross result of disaster insurance as the diﬀer-
ence between premium income and claims payments. From this we subtract
administrative costs, estimated at 10% of premium income to obtain gross
profits of the system. Finally, profits enter the accumulated system surplus
with financial returns estimated at the government bond rate of interest.
The claims-premium ratio, the rate of reinsurance and the CCR’s reserves
are obtained directly from the oﬃcial publication of the public reinsurer (CCR,
various years).
20The detailed table of calculations is available from the authors upon request.
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